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INTRODUCTION

Signed in Vienna on the eleventh day of April, 1980, the UN Sales Convention
(CISG)l is now entering its 25th year. Given the widespread adoption and application
of the Sales Convention, this Silver Anniversary will be celebrated as UNCITRAL's
greatest success story2 in Vienna, 3 and also at other gatherings of CISG aficionados
around the world. 4

1.

*
+

2

3
4

Professor of Law, University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Law. B.A. 1967, Lehigh University; J.D. 1971,
New York University School of Law; Cand.jur. 1981, Dr.jur. 1989, University of Copenhagen.
Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. A.B. 1973, Harvard College; A.M. 1975,
Harvard University; J.D. 1981, Harvard University School of Law.
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. II, 1980, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 98-9 (1983), 19 LL.M. 668 (1980) [hereinafter 'CISG' or 'Convention'] (entered
into force on Jan. I., 1988), available in 15 U.S.c.A. app. at 49 (West Supp. 1996),52 Fed. Reg. 6262
80,7737 (1987), U.N. DOC. NCONF. 97/18 (1980).
The (also highly successful) 1958 New York Convention (regarding the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards) was prepared by the United Nations prior to the existence of UNCITRAL,
although the promotion of this Convention later became an integral part of the Commission's program of
work.
See as regards UNCITRAL's 'Celebrating Success' Conference in Vienna, March 15 - 18,2005, details
available at: <http://www.uncitral.org/englishlnews/success.pdf>.
A Symposium celebrating the 25th Anniversary of the CISG will be held at the Center for International
Legal Education, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, November 4-5,2005.
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A key part of these celebrations will focus on UNCITRAL's new CISG Case Digest)
and on the numerous CISG decisions which are the focal point of that work. 6 The
academics who participate in these case law discussions will surely address what they
consider to be the 'best' CISG decisions and precedents, but there will also be
occasion to highlight the 'worst', especially since the Digest itself is a (UN) politically
correct and neutral document, totally devoid of praise and criticism of decisions
rendered by national courts. 7
Of course, we would hardly expect the organisers of these success-celebrations to
present 'Oscars' for the best CISG cases, let alone 'Razzies' for the worst,8 but in the
present (academic) context, at least, we see good reason to single out Raw Materials
Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GmbI-f as a case which might vie for inclusion in the
'Worst (CISG) Case' group.
Working independently, we have previously outlined certain criteria for assessing the
'precedential value' of individual CISG decisions rendered by national COurtS;10 in
Section 2 below we combine our criteria in a short-list of five points. On that basis, we
will explain why we would nominate the recent Forberich decision for the dubious
worse-case distinction (Section 3). We will argue for the nomination even recognising
that competition (at the bottom of the CISG barrel) is stiff, and that Forberich is no
'shoo-in' if we consider how the case might have been decided if better (more
persuasive) reasoning had been applied (Section 4). Lastly, we will indicate how the
more serious aspects of our (tongue-in-cheek) exercise might be of relevance for legal
educators and the future practice of CISG law in the courts.

2

ASSESSING THE QUALITY OF CISG DECISIONS

Article 7(1) CISG requires those interpreting the Convention to have 'regard' for 'its
international character and [... J the need to promote uniformity in its application'. It is
1.
5

6
7

8
9
10

Available online on the UNCITRAL website, <http://www.uncitral.org> (click the 'Case Law
(CLOUT)' button, then click the link labeled 'NEW: UNCITRAL Digest of case law on the United
Nations Convention on the International Sales of Goods'). A draft of the Digest is available in hard copy
in The Draft UNCITRAL Digest and Beyond: Cases, Analysis and Unresolved Issues in the u.N. Sales
Convention (Franco Ferrari, Harry Flechtner and Ronald A Brand, eds., SeIher, 2004).
Available online on the UNCITRAL website, <http://www.uncitral.org> (click the 'Case Law
(CLOUT)' button ).
See Sekolec, J., 'Digest of Case Law on the UN Sales Convention: The Combined Wisdom of Judges
and Arbitrators Promoting Unifonn Interpretation of the Convention', The Draft UNCITRAL Digest and
Beyond (Ferrari, Flechtner & Brand (eds.), supra fn. 5, at p. 14.
Compare, in the anti-Hollywood context, <http://www.razzies.com/asp/directorylXcDirectory.asp>.
2004 WL 1535839 (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, July 7,2004).
See Lookofsky, 1., 'CISG foreign case law: how much regard should we have?' in The Draft
UNCITRAL Digest and Beyond, supra fn. 5, at pp. 216 and 218-19; Lookofsky, J., 'Digesting CISG
Case Law: How Much Regard Should We Have?', (2004) 8 VJ 181, at p. 187; Flechtner, H.M.,
'Recovering Attorneys' Fees as Damages Under the U.N. Sales Convention (CISG): The Role of Case
Law in the New International Commercial Practice, with comments on Zapata Hennanos v. Hearthside
Baking', (2002) 22 Nw. J. lnt'! L. & Bus.12l.
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now a truism of elSa scholarship that this provision requires judges and arbitrators
applying the Convention to take into consideration CISa decisions by other tribunals,
particularly 'foreign' tribunals. ll While there is some uncertainty concerning the
binding force that CISa decisions by courts from other jurisdictions should enjoy,12
the better-reasoned position is that they should have persuasive, but not binding,
authorityY
The obligation to consult foreign decisions, a novelty for tribunals, raises a number of
interesting issues. One of the most is: what is the appropriate level of 'regard' for
foreign CISa decisions? As has proven to be the case with many elSa matters,14 on
this issue we find ourselves in agreement about the factors to consider in assessing the
deference due particular decisions that have applied the CISa. Thus each of us has,
independently, identified the stature of the tribunal rendering the decision and the
extent to which the decision is in accord with other decisions as factors that should
affect the weight to be accorded a case. 15 Another highly pertinent factor, we agree, is
the persuasive force of the reasoning in the decision l6 - in particular, the extent to
which the decision itself comports with the mandate of CISG article 7(1) to have
regard for the international character of the Convention and the need to promote
uniformity in its application and the observance ofgood faith in international tradeY
Finally, we agree that the apparent soundness of the result of the decision is a factor
that should go into the equation. 18 Because these criteria focus on the respect that a
particular CISa decision should command, we will use them to assess whether the
Martin Forberich decision indeed deserves the title, 'Worst CIS a Decision to Date'.

1.
11

12
13

14
15
16
l7
18

E.g., Lookofsky, J., Understanding the ClSG in the USA: A Compact Guide to the 1980 United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (2nd ed, 2004), at § 2.9; Flechtner, H.M.,
'Recovering Attorneys' Fees', supra fn. 10, at pp. 122-23 and authorities cited in fn. 6.
See Flechtner, 'Recovering Attorneys' Fees', supra note 10, at p. 124.
See Lookofsky, 'How much regard should we have?', supra fn. 10, at pp. 186, 218; Flechtner,
'Recovering Attorneys' Fees', supra fn 10], at p. 124; UNCITRAL Digest of case law on the United
Nations Convention on the International Sales ofGoods, supra fu. 5, Art 7, ~ 4 and decisions cited in fn.
13, available at:
<http://daccessdds.un.org/docfUNDOC/GENIV04/547/56/PDFN0454756.pdf?OpenElement> (visited
10 February 2005).
See, e.g., FJechtner, Hand Lookofsky, 1., 'Viva Zapata! American Procedure and CISG Substance in a
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal', (2003) 7 VJ93, at p. 94.
See Lookofsky, 'How much regard should we have', supra fn. 10, at pp. 218-19; Lookofsky, Digesting
CISG Case Law, supra fn. 5; Flechtner, 'Recovering Attorneys' Fees', supra fn 10, at pp. 143-44.
See Lookofsky, 'How much regard should we have', supra fn. 10, at p. 218; Lookofsky, Digesting CISG
Case Law, supra fu. 5; Flechtner, 'Recovering Attorneys' Fees', supra fn 10, at p. 14l.
Flechtner, 'Recovering Attorneys' Fees', supra fn. 10, at pp. 145-46.
Lookofsky, 'How much regard should we have', supra fn. 10, at p. 218; Lookofsky, Digesting CISG
Case Law, supra fu. 5. Flechtner would (tentatively) add another factor: the level of international trade
in the jurisdiction of the tribunal rendering the decision. Flechtner, 'Recovering Attorneys' Fees', supra
fn. 10,atpp. 144-45.
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3

NOMINATING MANFRED FORBERlCH

Given the more than 1,500 CISG cases reported thus far/ 9 many of them much
criticised in the burgeoning CISG literature, 2°it might seem audacious to nominate any
single CISG case for the 'Worse Case' award. Perhaps - but we nonetheless see good
reason to nominate Raw Materials Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GmbH21 because this
particular decision by a U.S. federal court, the latest in an unfortunate series of highly
unpersuasive American CISG precedents,22 seems to represent the very worst example
of the 'homeward trend'. This is the tendency of those interpreting the CISG to project
the domestic law in which the interpreter was trained (and with which he or she is
likely most familiar) onto the international provisions of the Convention. 23 Indulging
in the homeward trend, obviously, violates the mandate of Art. 7(1) (which requires
that the CISG be interpreted with 'regard' for its international character of for 'the
need to promote uniformity in its application') and constitutes a serious - quite
possibly the most serous - threat to the main purpose of the CISG: progress toward a
uniform regime of international sales law. In short, Manfred Forberich is our nominee
as the Worst CISG Case because it represents the most extreme example of what is
likely the most dangerous error that tribunals applying the CISG can make.
In making this nomination we should emphasise that we do not necessarily view the
outcome in Forberich (i.e., the court's decision to deny plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment)24 as 'wrong'; indeed, the court might actually have reached the
'right' result. 25 Our 'beef liies in the way the case was decided, since Forberich
provides a glaring and most disturbing example of how national courts sometimes
misuse domestic sales law to interpret and apply a treaty which demands an
international interpretation. 26 As is more fully explained below, we think Forberich
might deserve to win a CISG Silver Anniversary 'Razzie' solely by virtue of its
'achievement' with respect to just one of the factors we described in Section 2 above:
its reasoning is completely unpersuasive because the court completely ignores, and
even aggressively violates, the mandate of Art. 7(1) CISG. It most certainly does not

l.
19
20

21
22
23

24
25
26
202

See <http://cisgw3.law.pace.eduJcisg/text/caseciLhtml>.
For example, a number of U.S. decisions come in for criticism in Flechtner, H.M., 'The CISG in
American Courts: The Evolution (and Devolution) of the Methodology ofInterpretation', in Ferrari, F
(ed), Quo Vadis CISG (Brussels/Paris/Munich, forthcoming, 2005).
2004 WL 1535839 (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, July 7, 2004).
See Flechtner, 'The CISG in American Courts', supra fn. 20.
Honnold, 1., 'General Introduction', in Honnold, 1. (ed), Documentary History of the Uniform Law for
International Sales: The studies, deliberations and decisions that led to the i908 United Nations
Convention with introductions and Explanations 1, I (Kluwer Law and Tax Publishers, Deventer, 1989),
hereinafter Documentm)' Histo])'. See also Honnold, 1., 'The Sales Convention in Action - Uniform
International Words: Uniform Application?', (1988) 8 J.L. & Com. 207, at p. 208 (noting 'the tendency
to think that the words we see [in the text of the CISG] are merely trying, in their awkward way, to state
the domestic rule we know so well').
See inji-a, text with fn. 27-37.
That is, the result might well have been the same if the court had interpreted and applied the CISG
correctly: see infi'a Section 4.
See generaJly the discussion supra Section 2.
(2005) 9
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treat the CrSG as an international text, and it most certainly does not strive to achieve
(international) uniformity in its application. For this reason we believe this trial court
decision represents the absolute nadir of CISG interpretation thus far.
The case in question was brought by an American plaintiff-buyer (Raw Materials,
Inc.: 'RMI') which had purchased a quantity of used Russian railroad rail from a
Gennan seller (Manfred Forberich GmbH: 'MF'). Plaintiff claimed that MF was liable
in damages because it had failed to make timely delivery in the United States. RMI
moved for summary judgment, but MF defended on force majeure grounds, arguing
that it was exempted from liability under CrSG article 7927 because its failure to
deliver as agreed was due to unexpected adverse weather conditions.28
The parties agreed that 'the rail was to be shipped from the port in St. Petersburg,
Russia,29 and that MF's obligation under the original (written) contract was to deliver
the rails at RMI's plant in Chicago. 3D The parties disagreed, however, as to the content
of the contract as later orally amended3! - in particular, whether the amended contract
required the goods to arrive in the U.S. by the end of December, or whether the goods
merely had to be shipped from S1. Petersburg by that date. 32 Because the parties
agreed that, whatever the delivery date, MF was to ship from S1. Petersburg, the court
directed its discussion of MF's force majeure defense to the possibility of shipment
from that particular port and to the foreseeability of extreme weather conditions in
that area at the relevant time. 33
After noting that the parties agreed the CISG was the applicable law,34 and that the
defendant's force majeure defense was governed by Art. 79, the court endorsed the
plaintiffs general assertion that caselaw on U.S. domestic sales law (found in Art. 2 of
the Unifonn Commercial Code ('DCC'» could be used for 'guidance' in applying the

1.
27

28

29
30
31

32
33
34

Although the court's Memorandum Opinion does not state directly that RMI sought damages for MF's
failure to deliver, RMI asserted that MF 'chose not to ship the rail to RMl so that Forberich could, by
subsequently entering into more lucrative contracts with other purchasers, take advantage of the rise in
rail prices that occurred after RMJ and Forberich had entered their contract'. Footnote 5 of the Opinion.
If RMI could prove that assertion, it could recover damages, inter alia, for the difference between the
contract price and the market or cover price: see Arts. 75 and 76 CISG.
Under the American scheme, found § 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code ('DCC'), a seller's failure
to deliver by reason of impracticablity is not a breach. The direct effect of an exemption under Art. 79
CISG, in contrast, is to exempt the non-performing party from liability (damages). See Lookofsky,
Understanding the CISG in the USA, supra note 11, at § 6.14, fns. 152-154 and accompanying text.
See 2004 WL 1535839 at *1 and fn. 1 (emphasis added).
See 2004 WL 1535839 at *1.
The original written contract did not contain a provision requiring modifications to be in writing and
therefore, as the Forberich court correctly noted, the oral agreement to modifY was sufficient under Art.
29 CISG. See 2004 WL 1535839 at *5 fn. 9.
See 2004 WL 1535839 at *4-*5 (section B of the 'Discussion' part of the opinion, under the heading
'Whether the Frozen Port Could Have Prevented Performance').
ibid.
Ibid, at *3. Although the court does not spell out why the ClSG is applicable, the reason - presumably
is because the parties' respective places of business were in different CISG Contacting States (Art.
1(1 )(a) of the CISG), and because the parties had not agreed to contract out of the Convention (Art. 6).
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CISG, e.g., 'where the relevant CISG provisions track that [sic] of the VCC.'35 The
court declared in particular that caselaw interpreting the VCC's excuse provision (§ 2
615) 'provides guidance for interpreting the CISG's excuse provision since it contains
similar requirements as those set forth in Article 79.,36 For these reasons, and
emphasising that the defendant agreed to plaintiff s argument for this 'domestic
guidance' approach, the Court declared it would 'use as a guide caselaw interpreting a
similar provision of § 2-615 of the VCc.,3? That, in fact, was the court's final mention
of Art. 79, and of the CISG. No reference is made to foreign CISG case law, CISG
commentary, or to any other recognised source of guidance on the CISG. The court
then spends several pages analysing U.S. cases applying s. 2-615 VCC before
concluding that the plaintiff s summary judgment motion should be dismissed because
it might be possible for the defendant, at trial, to establish the elements necessary in
order to be exempted from liability for its non-performance.
The court's approach treats the exemption provision of Art. 79 as if it were
indistinguishable from U.S. domestic law. Nay, it treats the CISG (which the court
expressly found governed the transaction) as irrelevant - as if it were in some
unexplained fashion superceded by U.S. domestic law - since the court ignores even
the text of Art. 79 CISG, never mind the caselaw and commentary that has developed
on the provision. As one of us says elsewhere,
Not one word of this discussion would have to be changed if UCC
Article 2 had actually been the applicable law. A more flagrant and
depressing example of a court ignoring its obligations under CISG
article 7(1) and indulging- nay, wallowing in - the homeward trend is
hard to imagine. The court's methodology should mean that its
analysis will properly be ignored by other courts - both Us. and
foreign - that are called upon to apply CISG article 79.[. ..] The only
good that could come of the Manfred Forberich decision, in this
author's view, is if it became an example of what to avoid when
interpreting the CISG. 38
We are in complete agreement that, simply because of its astonishingly wrong-headed
interpretational methodology and its flagrant disregard of the mandate of Art. 7(1), the
Manfred Forberich decision is due little deference by other courts, both U.S. and
foreign, that are called upon to apply CISG article 79 - or, indeed, any provision of
the CISG. In addition, Forberich commands little respect under several other factors
we identified in Section 2 as relevant to assessing the deference due a CISG decision.
The decision was rendered by a trial court - not a court of high authority in the U.S.

1.
35
36
37
38

204

Ibid. (emphasis added), quoting De/chi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir.
1995).
Ibid. (emphasis added).
Ibid. (emphasis added).
Flechtner, H.M., 'The CISG in American Courts: The Evolution (and Devolution) of the Methodology
oflnterpretation'. in Quo Vadis CISG. supra fn. 20.
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legal system. And the decision is not in accord with other CISG decisions in its
approach: while other U.S. cases have also suggested that cases on U.S. sales law can
be used for guidance in interpreting the CISG,39 none have actually employed the
technique to the extreme degree that Forberich does (indeed, most expressly
acknowledge (at least) that UCC case law 'is not per se applicable'4o); cases outside
the U.S., furthennore, have not apparently adopted this misguided approach.
We make this (very negative) assessment of Forberich notwithstanding the fact that
'apparent soundness of result' is entitled to at least some weight on our own
precedential scale, i.e" even though the court might have reached the 'right' result in
denying plaintiffs motion for summary judgmen1. 41 In fact, it seems in this (result
oriented) respect significant that the undisputed facts did not preclude the possibility
that the frozen port in S1. Petersburg might actually have 'prevented' the seller from
performing its contractual obligation (to ship from that port, and to 'deliver' on time),
nor did those facts show that the freezing of the port was 'foreseeable' (as claimed by
the buyer). Indeed, since we shall now show why a very similar - though hardly
'identical' - set of (inherently elusive) factors might have led to the same result
under a 'real' CISG (Article 79) analysis, it seems difficult to maintain that the result
reached in Forberich was 'wrong'.

4

ASSESSING MANFRED FORBERICH UNDER ARTICLE 79

The CISG provisions collected under the 'Exemptions' heading (Part III, Chapter V.,
Section I of the CISG, comprising Arts. 79 and 80) deal with problems often discussed
in domestic sales law under such labels as impossibility, impracticability, and force
majeure. As applied to a seller's breach, Art. 79 provides a limited exception to the
usual CISG rule, as set forth in Art. 45(1), that liability for damages is "strict".42
Taken together, Arts. 45(1) and 79 constitute what a Civilian jurist might refer to as
the CISG gap-filling 'liability base': they answer the question of whether the injured
party is entitled to damages (at all),43
Article 79(1) contains the main 'exemption' provision applicable to either party's
failure to perfonn. To determine whether the obligor in Manfred Forberich should be
entitled to an Art. 79(1) exemption, we note what the court in Forberich glaringly
failed to acknowledge - that the courts in all Contracting States are bound to 'have
1.
39

40
41
42
43

Schmitz-Werke GmbH v. Rockland Industries. Inc., 2002 WL 1357095 (U.S. Cl. App. 4th Cir., 21 June
2002); Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.2d 1024, 1028 (2nd Cir. 1995); Chicago Prime
Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 320 F. Supp.2d 702, at 709 ff. (N.D. Ill. 2004); Chicago
Prime Packers. Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 2003 WL 21254261 at *4 (U.S.D.C. N.D. IIl., 29
May 2003); Claudia s.n.c. v. Olivieri Footwear Ltd, 1998 WL 164824 at *4 (U.S.D.C.S.D.N.Y., 7 April
1998).
E.g., Deichi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex CO/p., 7J F.2d 1024, 102R (2nd Cir. 1995); Claudia s.n.c. v. Olivieri
Footwear Ltd, 1998 WL 164824 at *4 (U.S.D.C.S.D.N.Y., 7 April 1998).
i.e., had the CISG been properly applied. See generally infra, Section 4.
Ie." such that liability is triggered by the obligor's failure to perform, without regard to the reasons or
possible 'excuses' therefor. See Lookofsky, Understanding the ClSG in the USA, supra th. 11, at § 6-14.
If we fmd a 'basis' ofliability, we then use Arts. 74-77 to measure compensation due.
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regard' to the international character of the treaty and the need to promote its uniform
application. 44
Applying paragraph 1 of Art. 79 to the situation in Manfred Forberich, we see that the
seller (MF) should remain liable to perform its delivery obligation unless it proves that
four conditions are fulfilled. 45 First, MF (bearing the burden of proof) must convince
the court of the existence of an impediment to performance, something that got 'in the
[obligor's] way.' The kind of impediments most often alleged as exempting
contingencies relate to the seller's obligation to make timely delivery (as in Manfred
Forberich), although it is certainly possible to conceive of 'impediments' that might
impact upon a given seller's obligation to deliver conforming goods. 46 In any event, it
seems undeniable that the extreme winter conditions in St. Petersburg qualify as an
'impediment' in the Article 79 sense.47
The second condition for relief under Article 79 is that the party seeking an exemption
must prove the impediment lies (or at least lay at the time for performance) beyond his
control. Since, for example, a CISG obligor like MF should always be deemed 'in
control' ofhislher own business and financial condition in general, internal 'excuses'
connected with business operations (poor quality control, etc.) or financial
management would never be held 'beyond' that party's contro1. 48 Conversely, we
might expect the buyer (RMI) in Manfred Forberich to acknowledge that the
impediment to performance alleged in this case - the extreme weather leading to the
freezing of the harbor in St. Petersburg -lay 'beyond [:NIP's] control'.
To this we add the third condition: the non-performing party (MF) must demonstrate
that, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, the impediment could not reason
ably have been foreseen (taken into account). Because nearly all potential
impediments to performance - even wars, fires, embargoes and terrorism (let alone
late trains and bad weather) - are increasingly 'foreseeable' in the modem
commercial environment, this is often the most difficult Art. 79 element to prove. 49
And this seems fair enough: Article 79 is, after all, a gap-filling rule, and the party
damaged by the fruition of a foreseeable contingency might have protected himself by
a more lenient (express) force majeure clause that specifically granted exemption if
1.
44
45

46

47
48

49

206

Article 7(1) CISG.
See generally Lookofsky, 'Fault and No-Fault in Danish, American and International Sales Law:
The Reception of the United Nations Sales Convention', (1983) 27 Scandinavian Studies in Law 109.
Some combine the 'impediment' and 'control' factors, which are listed separately in the text of Art.
79( I), thus reducing the list of conditions to three.
Accord Lookofsky, Fault and No-Fault, supra fn. 45, at 2.4 and 3.3; Stoll in Schlechtriem, P.,
Commental)'/Kolllmentar, Art. 79, Rd.Nr. 12,45-47. But see Honnold, Uniform Law § 427. Professor
Honnold's' American' view notwithstanding, the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Germany
in 1999 in the 'Vine Wax' case lends clear and convincing support to this more expansive reading of
Article 79. See Bundesgerichtshof, 24 March 1999, CLOUT Case 271. See also Schlechtriem, P.,
Bundesgerichtshof(available in English at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990324gLhtrnl>).
See Lookofsky, Understanding the ClSG in the USA, supra fn. 11, at § 6-19.
Accord Schlechtriem, Jnt. UN-Kaufrecht, Rd.Nr. 289.
See para. 5 of Secretariat COIl1/11ental)' to Article 65 of the 1978 Draft Convention.
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the (foreseeable) impediment occurred. 50 On the other hand, since the CISG
foreseeability criterion (arguably) remains a question ofdegree, the fact that the (early
winter) weather conditions in St. Petersburg were (as described by MF) the 'worst in
50 years', the district court might - consistently with foreign CISG precedents on the
foreseeability issue - classify the impediment in question as 'unforeseeable' at the
time of contracting. At least this would be the case if MF (at trial) were able to
convince the trier of fact to accept its version of the Forberich facts.
Before pursuing that line of (foreseeablily) argument, we note the fourth and final Art.
79(1) exemption-condition, which requires that the non-performing party make
reasonable efforts to avoid or overcome the impediment in question or its
consequences. Since this requirement must be met even in cases where the
impediment could not reasonably be foreseen, it represents a potentially formidable
barrier to a would-be exemptee, particularly in the common case of generically
defined obligations. 51 But since the parties in Manfred Forberich agreed that the
seller's obligation under the contract was in fact to ship the goods from St.
Petersburg,52 it seems reasonable to conclude that - depending on which party's
version of the (disputed) facts the trier-of-fact accepted - Manfred Forberich might
not have been able to avoid or overcome the freezing of the port, assuming that
impediment to have been an unforeseeable one.
Since paragraphs 2-5 of Article 79 do not seem relevant under the facts of Manfred
Forberich,53 we can summarise what we - by 'process of elimination' - see as the
1.
50
51

52
53

The District Court which decided Manfred Forberich was, of course, aware of this.
If, for example, RMJ were not only able to establish that Manfred Forberich's obligation under the
contract has been to deliver 'rails' (of the designated type), but also that Manfred Forberich' s contractual
obligation was not limited to any particular source ofsupply, then the fact that Manfred Forberich itself
'intended' to ship goods acquired from a source near St. Petersburg and make delivery from that port
would not exempt that seller from liability under Art. 79(1). In that case the seller could have avoided or
overcome the impediment simply by securing an alternative (non-St. Petersburg) source. Accord para. 5
of Secretariat Commentary to Art. 65 of the 1978 Draft Convention (party required to provide
commercially reasonable substitute). See also Example 65B at ibid (delivery of replacement machine
tools) and OLG Hamburg, 28 February 1997, CLOUT Case 227, also in CISGW3 and UNILEX (seller
not exempt under Art. 79 or under standard force majeure clause, since 'seller's risk' covers non
delivery caused by its supplier; seller only exempt if impossible to find goods of similar quality on
market).
See text supra with fn. 29.
Paragraph (2) of Art. 79 deals with the situation whcre a party's failure to perform is 'due to the failure
by a third person whom he has engaged to perform the whole or a part of the contract'. In this case the
party claiming the exemption is exempt from liability only if: (a) he is exempt under Art. 79(1) and (b)
the person whom he has so engaged would be so exempt if the provisions of that paragraph were applied
to him. Although Art.e 79(2) has provoked a good deal of discussion, the CISG rule should be
interpreted as one having a limited range of application, and it would not seem to be relevant under the
facts of the Manfred Forberich case. Under Art. 79(3), the exemption provided by Art. 79 has effect
only for the period during which the impediment exists. Therefore, when a temporary impediment to
performance abates, the non-performing seller becomes liable once again. On the other hand, since Art.
79 does not prevent the buyer from exercising any right other than to claim damages (Art. 79(5)), a
serious delay (e.g.) by the seller will entitle the buyer to avoid, thus ending the contract by reason of
fundamental breach. Finally, under Art. 79(4) the seller who fails to perform must give notice of the
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key (sub)issues relevant to resolution of the exemption question in Manfred
Forberich: Was the impediment to perfonnance - the frozen harbor in St. Petersburg
- one that the seller could reasonably have overcome? And if not, ought MF
nonetheless have 'taken [that impediment] into account,' i.e., foreseen that possible
contingency at the time of contracting?
Without undertaking an exhaustive analysis of these issues here, we submit that this
particular case - if judged on the basis of (universally acknowledged) sources of
CISG law, including CISG foreign case law - might 'go either way'.54 If we are
right about that, the district's court's decision in Manfred Forberich, while horrible in
its essential approach, might have reached the correct result, and might not end up the
hands-down winner of our 'worst case' award.
5

CONCLUSIONS

The patently improper approach to interpreting and applying the ClSG taken by the
U.S. District Court in Manfred Forberich is a depressing development that tends to
bring international disrepute on the ClSG jurisprudence of U.S. courts. We sincerely
hope the case is soon buried and forgotten, except perhaps as an example of an
interpretational methodology to be avoided at all costs. Perhaps our nomination for the
ClSG Silver Anniversary 'Razzie' will help further that goal.
Given the ignorance demonstrated not only by the Manfred Forberich court but also
by both parties' counsel, we would underline the importance of educating law students
and practicing lawyers about the ClSG. Experienced commercial practitioners have
explained that some lawyers who advise their clients to 'opt out' of the Convention do
so to avoid the application of a rule-set which they never learned about in law school
or elsewhere, and therefore do not understand.55 But since parties with relatively equal
bargaining power will seldom (knowingly) 'opt in' to the unlevel playing field of one
party's domestic law, the ClSG will continue to apply (by default or by agreement) to
an increasingly large number of international sales contracts. So now - after 25 years
of ClSG success - it is high time that more law schools require (or at least
encourage) their students to learn something about the Convention, just as those
lawyers and judges already practicing in the real world must take the steps necessary
to bring themselves up to ClSG speed.
2.

54

55
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impediment and its effects on his ability to perfonn. If the notice is not received by the buyer within a
reasonable time after the seller knew or ought to have known of the impediment, the seller is liable for
damages resulting from such non-receipt. See generally Lookofsky, Understanding the CISG in the
USA, supra fn. 11, at § 6-19.
While one of us has argued that several existing non-U.S. decisions applying Art. 79 would have been
'relevant and useful' and provided 'important guidance' to thc Manfred Forberich court had it been
aware of those decisions (see Flechtner, 'The CISG in American Courts', in Quo Vadis CISG, supra fu.
20), we agree that none of those decisions would have been dispositive on the facts of Manfred
Forberich, and thus none would have mandated a different result in the case.
For a persuasive argument along these lines, see Holdsworth, J., 'Practical Application of the CISG',
available at: <http://www.dh1aw.de/engl04yubliidocuments/CISG.PDF>.
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